Accounts of the mistakes of the Bush administration in the pre-war planning for the Iraq war has finally made its way to Sweden. Swedish media is picking up bits and pieces of the US debate on the issue. Hopefully not in the antiamerican sense, but out of growing knowledge that an opportunity was missed, or at least partially missed, in Iraq.
Yet again I can recommend an article in The Atlantic Monthly (January/February 2004). In
"Blind Into Baghdad" James Fallows suggests that the "U.S. occupation of Iraq is a debacle not because the government did no planning but because a vast amount of expert planning was willfully ignored by the people in charge." No matter if we're talking about underestimating the total number of American troops needed to secure the peace, dismantling the Iraqi security forces, ignoring ethnic division, grossly overestimating the Iraqi public's thankfulness towards their liberators, Fallows seem to have a point.
On the same theme, Larry Diamond's article
"What Went Wrong In Iraq", in Foreign Affairs (September/October 2004), suggests that:
"Although the early U.S. blunders in the occupation of Iraq are well known, their consequences are just now becoming clear. The Bush administration was never willing to commit the resources necessary to secure the country and did not make the most of the resources it had. U.S. officials did get a number of things right, but they never understood-or even listened to-the country they were seeking to rebuild. As a result, the democratic future of Iraq now hangs in the balance."And recently a journalist of The New York Times and a retired Marine Corps lieutenant general and former military correspondent for The Times published the book "
Cobra II". According to a
reiview in The New York Times the authors explain:
"[H]ow the administration of President George W. Bush drove the nation to war in Iraq, and how decisions made before the invasion and immediately following Mr. Hussein's ouster precipitated the vicious insurgency now wracking that country."During pre war planning, it was reasonable to suggest, in accordance to General Eric Shinseki and others, that winning the war was, comparatively, less of a problem than securing a vast country with complex demographics and other complicating factors, with a mere 135.000 or so of US troops. That was, if not futile then at least, highly unlikely.
This and other obvious mistakes only strengthen those who believe that the USA can only win wars and always fail to win peace. And those opposing the war in itself (and the US?) are surely very content on "being right all along". This war would obviously have been "more" legitimate and logical (and thus easily understood by public opinion worldwide) back in the early 1990s when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. This time around it was far more difficult to find a causal connection or a set of universally accepted arguments to ouster the dictator in Baghdad. However, this is not something that the US alone can be blamed for. The process leading up to how things are in Iraq today is much more complex indeed. Unfortunately, those mistrusting or even hating the USA are very prone to draw confused conclusions of chronical US incompetence to build peace or a hidden agenda for world domination. Usually they draw their conclusions based on outright lies, innuendos, ideological imperatives and other things. Now, the chaos in Iraq is, in their opinion, pure confirmation of what they already "knew".